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Does It Help, Hurt, or Something Else? The Effect of a Something Else
Response Alternative on Children's Performance
on Forced-Choice Questions
Kamala London

Ashley K. Hall

University of Toledo

Ohio Department of Education

Nicole E. Lytle
Montclair State University
Forensic guidelines recommend minimizing forced-choice questions when interviewing children. We
investigated whether adding a "something else" alternative to forced-choice questions affected 3- to
5-year-olds' (N = 94) reports of an event involving innocuous touch. Following a I-week delay, children
were randomly assigned to receive either standard 2-alternative forced-choice questions or the same
questions with an additional something else alternative. All children received 3 counterbalanced question
types: correct alternative present, no correct alternative present, and unanswerable. Children's overall
accuracy was not affected by the something else alternative except on questions with no correct
alternative present, where performance went from 15% to 31% accurate. Children selected or generated
inaccurate and speculative responses to the majority of unanswerable questions regardless of a something
else alternative. These findings suggest that the inclusion of a something else alternative does not bypass
concerns about the use of forced-choice questions during interviews with children.
Keywords: forensic interviews, questioning techniques, children's eyewitness testimony, forced-choice
questions, something else alternative

Developmental psychologists have long expressed concern
about the use of forced-choice questions during forensic interviews
with children (e.g., Bruck & Ceci, 1997, 1999, 2004; Bruck, Ceci,

2001; Rocha, Marche, & Briere, 2013). Children generally do not
provide do not know responses (Walker, Lunning, & Eilts, 1996),
even with instructions regarding the acceptability of a "do not
know" reply (Earhart. La Rooy, Brubacher, & Lamb, 2014; Peterson & Grant, 2001).
Interview protocols around the world recommend judicious use
of forced-choice questions when interviewing child witnesses
(e.g., American Professional Society on the Abuse of Children,
2012; CornerHouse, 2004; Davies & Westcott, 1999; Great Britain
Ministry of Justice, 2011; Lamb, Hershkowitz, Orbach, & Esplin,
2008; State of Michigan Governor's Task Force on Children's
Justice and Department of Human Services, 2004; Yuille, Cooper,
& Hervd, 2009). Despite best practice recommendations, many
forensic interviewers continue to rely on forced-choice questions
(Davies & Westcott, 1999; Lamb et al., 2008; Lamb, Orbach,
Hershkowitz, Esplin, & Horowitz, 2007; Lamb, Sternberg, Orbach, Esplin, Stewart, & Mitchell, 2003). Although acknowledging
the increased risk for inaccurate responses associated with forcedchoice questions, some child abuse professionals argue children's
answers to open-ended prompts are too sparse, thereby necessitating the use of forced-choice questions, particularly among
preschool-aged children (e.g., Faller, 2000).
A novel modification to standard two-alternative forced-choice
questions involves the addition of a third alternative, the option to
select something else. The "something else" alternative has become ubiquitously used by child interviewers in the United States
(e.g., Anderson et al., 2010; Bourg et al., 1999; CornerHouse,
2004; Faller, 2000; Miller, 2008; Oregon Department of Human

& Hembrooke, 2002, Ceci & Bruck, 1993, 1995; Orbach & Lamb,

&

&

2001; Peterson & Grant, 2001; Zaragoza, Payment, Ackil, Drivdahl, & Beck, 2001). Although the strategy of using forced-choice
questions increases the probability that children will provide information, it is problematic because children's answers to these
types of questions often are inaccurate (Bruck, London, Landa,
Goodman, 2007; Lamb, Sternberg, Esplin, Hershkowitz, & Orbach, 1997; Lamb, Hershkowitz, Orbach, & Esplin, 2008; Mehrani
& Peterson, 2015; Poole & Lindsay, 1998, Roebers & Fernandez,
2002; Zaragoza et al., 2001). Children have particular trouble
when faced with forced-choice questions when neither response
alternative is correct (Bourg, Broderick, Flagor, Kelly, Ervin,
Butler, 1999; Fritzley, Lindsay, & Lee, 2013: Peterson & Grant,
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Services, 2012; Walker, 2013). For example, CornerHouse (2004),
a widely used set of guidelines in the United States, indicates the

following:
Multiple-choice questions provide two or three options from which a
child can choose a response. Interviewers can generally expect a child
will select one of the options provided. The most appropriate multiplechoice questions include an alternative response, or an "out" option.
That is, children should be given the opportunity to select a response
that was not offered: "Do you live in an apartment. in a house, or some
other place?" or "Were you sitting. lying down, or doing something
else?" (p. 232)
The rationale for including the something else alternative is that
interviewers usually are unaware of whether they are including a
correct response option in their forced-choice questions. The
something else alternative provides children with another option so
they are not locked into selecting one of the two alternatives
provided. The goal of the current research was to examine whether
the something else alternative enhances children's response accuracy to forced-choice questions regarding an experienced event.
Because the interviewer does not know whether they are providing a correct answer choice, the something else option might
encourage children to provide an answer of their own if the correct
answer is not present. A something else response is different than
a do not know response in this regard. A do not know response
implies the child does not have the requisite knowledge to answer
the question. A something else reply, on the other hand, indicates
the child has knowledge but that the answer is different than the
two choices provided. Because a something else answer choice
implies the child knows the answer, interviewers ask the child to
clarify with a directive prompt as in the following example:
Interviewer (I): Has anyone touched you in a private place?
Child (C): My dad.
1: In which private place did your dad touch you?
C: Pee pee.
1: Did he touch you with his hand, his mouth, or something else?
C: Something else.
1: What did he use to touch your pee pee?
C: His pee part.
To our knowledge, only one published study has reported data
regarding the effect of a something else alternative on children's
responses. Stolzenberg, McWilliams, and Lyon (2017) compared
3- to 6-year-old children's performance on questions involving
placement and spatial language. Children were questioned with
either standard forced-choice, forced-choice with an added something else alternative, yes/no, or wh-type questions. In their study,
Stolzenberg et al. showed children human figurines with clothing
completely on, completely off, or partially on, and children were
randomly assigned to the different question conditions to describe
the clothing placement. In a second task, children were asked to
describe whether a sticker was over, under, or partially under the
clothing. Of relevance to the current study, children performed
almost identically on the forced-choice questions regardless of the

inclusion of the something else option. Although the Stolzenberg
et al. study is important in shedding light on questioning methods
regarding spatial language and clothing placement, we seek to
expand upon two central methodological features of their study to
broaden the implications for forensic practice. Foremost. Stolzenberg et al. did not prompt children for responses after they selected
the something else alternative. Therefore, we are left not knowing
whether the something else option, along with its accompanying
prompt, might bolster children's reports. In forensic interviews,
children are prompted to supply their own alternative following the
choice of "something else." One possibility is that the something
else alternative might bolster children's performance when children are actually allowed to generate their own response alternative. Second, Stolzenberg et al. questioned children about clothing
and sticker placements that were contemporaneously occurring.
All of the questions pertained to truly occurring contemporaneous
events. As we argue next, the driving force for including a something else alternative in forensic interviews is that interviewers
might ask children questions where the child does not have requisite knowledge to answer the question or where no correct
answer choice is provided.
In light of extant developmental research, how should we expect
the something else alternative to affect children's responses? Children generally perform well in correctly recognizing true event
details even in the absence of a something else option (e.g.,
London. Bruck, & Poole, 2011; Rocha et al., 2013). Assuming a
forced-choice question with an obvious correct answer choice is
posed, children should perform quite well regardless of the inclusion of a something else alternative. One possible benefit of the
something else option is that children may provide their own
response if they do not recognize a correct answer choice. For
example, if an interviewer asked a child whether they wore a skirt
or jeans, but the child does not remember that detail, then the child
could accurately say they were wearing a hat (a different but also
true detail). However, another possibility is that the something else
alternative distracts children from the correct answer choice, leading to a reduction in the quality of children's reports to true
questions.
In theory, questions that have no correct response alternative are
ideally suited for the inclusion of a something else alternative. For
example, imagine in a forensic setting that a child had been
sexually abused by an adult who took partially nude photographs
of the child. The interviewer could ask, "When he took your
picture, did you have your clothes on, off, or something else?" If
the child correctly picked the something else alternative, the interviewer would logically prompt the child with a directive prompt
such as, "How were your clothes'?" The child could then respond
that their clothes were partially off. In terms of cognitive demands,
to benefit from a something else alternative, children would need
to resist picking one of the initial incorrect answer choices and
instead pick the something else option. Following the selection of
the something else alternative, children would need to selfgenerate a correct detail when prompted.
One potential problem with the something else alternative is that
interviewers might ask questions where the premise of the question
itself, not just the answer choices, is incorrect. Imagine a case
where a child is asked if they were touched over or under their
underwear, but that no inappropriate touching ever took place. The
child might reply "something else," similar to a reply of "don't
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know," simply because neither of the two provided alternatives is
correct. However, the interviewer would be trained to prompt,
"Where were you touched?" At this point, like with a standard
two-alternative forced-choice question, to succeed on the question,
the child would have to volunteer that neither option is correct;
they were not touched at all. However, to date, no published
studies have explored whether or at what age children can proficiently use the something else alternative and subsequently generate their own correct response alternative. Does the something
else alternative help children resist picking an incorrect answer
choice? If so, can they successfully generate their own correct
alternative?
Unanswerable forced-choice questions are questions for which
the child does not have the requisite knowledge to answer, that is,
the question requires them to speculate (Beuscher & Roebers,
2005; Fritzley & Lee, 2003; Waterman & Blades, 2011: Waterman, Blades, & Spencer, 2000). Unanswerable questions encourage children to guess or speculate, as the only appropriate response
would be "I don't know" or somehow challenging the question
(Pratt, 1990; Roebers & Fernandez, 2002; Waterman & Blades,
2011; Waterman et al., 2000; Waterman, Blades, & Spencer,
2004). Unanswerable forced-choice questions pose particular difficulty for children. For example, Hughes and Grieve (1980)
explored 5- and 7-year-old children's responses to four questions
that did not have logical answers (e.g., "Is red heavier than
yellow?" "One day there were two flies crawling up a wall. Which
fly got to the top first?"). Hughes and Grieve found young children
offered replies to these bizarre questions the majority of the time
(87.5%), whereas the 7-year-olds provided a response every time
(100%; for similar findings, see Rocha et al., 2013).
In the case of unanswerable questions, we predicted a something
else alternative is unlikely to bolster children's performance. On
the one hand, the something else alternative may assist children to
not be "locked in" to picking one of the other choices. However,
if a child replies "something else" to an unanswerable question,
then they would then be queried with a follow-up prompt and be
expected to provide an answer. For example, imagine a child is
asked the following question about which they have no requisite
knowledge: "Is my dad a firefighter, a veterinarian, or something
else?" The child replies "something else." They would then be
prompted, "What does he do?" At this point, the empirical question is whether the child will speculate (e.g., "He is a police
officer") or use this follow-up prompt to correctly state they have
no knowledge (i.e., "I don't know what my dad does."). However,
a large literature indicates children have difficulty resisting selecting a response and indicating they do not know (e.g., Earhart et al.,
2014). Therefore, we did not expect that the something else option
would bolster performance on unanswerable questions.
The goal of the current study was to examine whether the
addition of a something else alternative affected children's performance on forced-choice questions. Given the rationale for including the added alternative in forensic interviews, we were particularly interested in whether the something else alternative aided
children in resisting false and unanswerable questions.

Design Overview
Children participated in a staged event involving innocuous
touch. Following a 1-week delay, children were individually in-
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terviewed about the event. Children were randomly assigned to
one of two experimental conditions: standard two-alternative
forced-choice questions or two-alternative forced-choice questions
with an added something else option. All children received three
different question types: (a) correct answer present (for clarity and
simplicity, termed true questions), (b) no correct answer present
(false questions), and (c) questions that require speculation (unanswerable questions). We examined the extent to which the something else alternative bolstered or impeded children's overall accuracy on the three question types. We also report children's
accuracy specifically when they provided a self-generated response to the something else option. We tested preschool-aged
children given some practitioners have argued forced-choice questions are particularly necessary for young children due to their
limited communication skills.

Method
Participants
Children (N = 94, 48 females) were recruited from schools and
childcare centers in a Midwestern city and ranged in age from 3to 5-years-old (38 to 71 months; M = 54 months, SD = 9 months).
There were 3-year-olds (n = 28; 17 female), 4-year-olds (n = 35;
15 female), and 5-year-olds (n = 31; 16 female). Approximately
84% of children were Caucasian, 14% were African American,
and less than 2% were of other races. The study was approved by
our institutional review board.

Procedure
Event. Children initially participated in a 20-min event that
was part of a larger study of children's use of forensic interview
aids. In the event, a research assistant touched children on different
"public" locations on the child's body and then asked the child to
show on either a doll or a human-figure drawing where they were
touched. See Lytle, London, and Bruck (2015) for full event

details.
Interview. Children were individually interviewed about the
touch event following a 1-week delay (M = 7.7 days, SD = 2.33
days). Each child was asked 30 forced-choice questions and was
randomly assigned to one of two question conditions. Half the
children (3-year-olds [14], 4-year-olds [17], and 5-year-olds [16])
were randomly assigned to receive the standard two-alternative
version of the questions (standard condition). The other half of
children (3-year-olds [14], 4-year-olds [18], and 5-year-olds [15])
received the same question with an added something else option
(something else condition). See Table I for example questions. (A
full list of questions is available by contacting the corresponding
author.)
All children received 10 each of three different forced-choice
question types. For true questions, the correct answer choice was
alternated as the first versus second option. In the second question
type, termed false questions, no correct answer choice was provided. In the third question type, children would not have relevant
information to answer the question correctly (i.e., unanswerable
questions).
In the something else condition, children were asked the same
questions as in the standard condition but were also given a third
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Table 1

Questions in the Standard Versus Something Else Conditions
Condition
Question type
True
False
Unanswerable

Standard

Something else

Did you play with a doll or a monkey?
Did (name of researcher from Session I)
tickle you or arm wrestle you?
Is (name of researcher from Session 1)'s
dad a firefighter or a doctor?

Did you play with a doll, a monkey, or something else?
Did (name of researcher from Session 1) tickle you,
arm wrestle you, or something else?
Is (name of researcher from Session I)'s dad a
firefighter, a doctor, or something else?

response alternative of something else (see Table 1). In keeping
with forensic interview practices, the something else alternative
always was provided as the final response choice. If a child chose
"something else" as their response, then the interviewer asked a
follow up question. For example, if the interviewer asked, "Did
you play with a doll, a monkey, or something else?" and the child
chose "something else," then the interviewer asked, "What did you
play with?" Question order was randomized via a computer, and
10 different question orders were used.
Scoring. For all question types, children's responses were
coded for accuracy and also according to whether the child selected one of the provided alternatives or if they provided a
self-generated response. A self-generated response could occur in
two different ways. First, responses were coded as self-generated
if they resulted from the researcher's prompt following a child's
something else response. For example: "Did you play with a
baseball, a monkey, or something else?" If the child replied "something else," then he or she was asked. "What did you play with?"
The child's response to the something else prompt was coded as
self-generated. Second, some children spontaneously generated
their own response without explicitly saying the words "something
else." For example, if asked "Did you play with a baseball or a
monkey?", a child could reply, "A doll." If children generated their
own response without explicitly saying "something else," then the
response also was coded as self-generated.
The correct answer to false questions was to respond "neither"
or to self-generate a correct detail. "Don't know" responses were
also tallied. For unanswerable questions, children were credited
with correct responses when they replied any derivative of "don't

know" to either the initial question or the researcher's follow-up

prompt.
Scoring was objective, and all of the interviews were independently checked by three coders to ensure no errors were present.
The corresponding author also tallied all of the variables to ensure
each category of responses totaled the correct number to ensure no
errors in counts occurred.

Results
Analytic Overview and Preliminary Analyses
There were no gender differences in children's performance, so
data were collapsed across this variable. All means are the proportion correct out of 10 questions for each question type. Bonferroni corrections were applied for multiple comparisons. First.
for each question type, we report children's responses (correct,
incorrect, or do not know) according to whether the child selected
one of the two answer choices (initial responses) or whether they
self-generated their own response (self-generated responses). Not
surprisingly, children in the standard question condition never used
the term something else before self-generating a response. In the
something else condition, children stated the term "something
else" before self-generating a response 71% of the time they
self-generated replies.
Analyses are conducted on the total correct responses (which is
the sum of the correct initial responses and correct self-generated
responses which appear in bold in Tables 2 through 4). Analyses
focus on correct responses because, from a forensic standpoint, the

Table 2
Children's Responses to True Questions by Age and Interview Condition
Gave initial response
Condition/Age
Standard
3 (n = 14)
4 (n = 17)
5 (n = 16)
Total
Something else
3 (n = 14)
4 (n = 18)
5 (n = 15)
Total

Self-generated a response

Correct

Incorrect

Don't know

Correct

Incorrect

Don't know

.50
.51
.71
.58

.46
.37
.18
.33

.01
.05
.05
.04

.01
.05
.05
.03

.02
.02
.02
.02

.00
.00
.00
.00

.31
.29
.60
.40

.31
.37
.16
.29

.09
.05
.03
.06

.16
.15
.10
.13

.11
.07
.07
.09

.03
.06
.03
.04

Note. Rows may not add to one due to rounding. The bolded values are the two columns that when summed
show the children's total accuracy.
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variable of interest is whether children ultimately did or did not
provide a correct response (or resist an incorrect response).
Following the overall accuracy analysis, for each question type,
we report data specifically examining the accuracy of selfgenerated responses only. That is, among children who selfgenerate statements, how accurate were the responses?

accuracy rates for these self-generated answers in the standard and
something else condition did not significantly differ, X2 (1) = 1.04,
p = .31.
Taken together, children in the something else condition are
using the something else option (and then self-generating responses) more often than children in the standard condition on the
true question items, but about half of children's self-generated
responses were incorrect. The relatively low accuracy rates in
self-generated responses explain the above findings showing that
the something else option does not improve children's overall
accuracy on the true questions compared with the standard forcedchoice condition.

True Questions
Overall accuracy. Collapsed across age, children were 61%
correct on true items in the standard condition versus 54% correct
in the something else condition. A 2 (condition: standard vs.
something else) X 3 (age: 3- to 4- vs. 5-year-olds) analysis of
variance (ANOVA) was conducted on the total number of correct
responses to the 10 true question items (i.e., the sum of the initial
and self-generated correct columns that appear in bold in Table 2).
The results revealed a main effect of age, F(2, 94) = 15.19, p <
.001,
2 = .26. The 5-year-olds outperformed both the 3- and
4-year-olds (ps < .001) with the latter two groups not differing
from one another (p > .20). Neither the main effect of condition,
F(2, 94) = 2.87, p = .094, T12 = .03, nor the Condition X Age
interaction, F(2, 94) = 0.31, p = .73 1, q2 = .01, attained significance. See Table 2. Next, we further examine accuracy on selfgenerated responses only.

Accuracy on self-generated responses.
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False Questions
Overall accuracy. Collapsed across age, children responded
accurately to 15% of the false question items in the standard
condition versus 31% correct in the something else condition. A 2
(condition: standard vs. something else) X 3 (age: 3- to 4- vs.
5-year-olds) ANOVA was conducted on the total number of correct responses to the 10 false question items. See Table 3. Paralleling the findings on the true questions, the results revealed a main
effect of age, F(2, 94) = 46.06, p = .001, q2 = .14. The
5-year-olds again outperformed both the 3- and 4-year-olds (p =
.001 and p = .04, respectively) with the latter two groups not
differing from one another (p = .59). A main effect of condition,
F(2, 94) = 9.56, p = .003, T1 2 = .26, revealed children in the
something else condition (M = 0.31, SD = 0.27) outperformed
children in the standard condition (M = 0.15, SD = 0.28). The
Condition X Age interaction, F(2, 94)
1.42, p = .247, T2 = .03,
did not attain significance. Children in both experimental conditions performed quite poorly in correctly rejecting false items with
the something else condition resulting in a nominally better performance, albeit at only 31% correct. That is, children either chose
or self-generated incorrect responses to the vast majority of questions regardless of the something else option.
Accuracy on self-generated responses. Next, we examined
performance only among the self-generated responses for false
questions. In the standard condition, 8% of children's total 470
responses were self-generated, for a total of 37 self-generated
responses. Of these 37 responses, 29 (78%) were correct. In the

Although the accu-

racy rates did not differ in the standard versus something else
conditions, we were interested in accuracy specifically when children provided a self-generated reply, so we more closely examined
those responses. As noted in the Method section, children were
credited with a self-generated response if they either self-generated
a reply to the something else prompt or if they spontaneously
provided their own response alternative instead of choosing one of
the two alternatives provided.
Across all children in the standard condition, 5% of the overall
responses derived from self-generated responses. This represents a
total of 25 self-generated responses (out of a grand total of 470
responses, n = 47 X 10 true items). Of these 25 self-generated
responses, 16 (64%) were correct. Among children in the something else condition, 26% of the 470 overall responses derived
from self-generated responses, for a total of 123 self-generated
responses. Of these 123 responses, 65 (53%) were correct. The

Table 3
Children's Responses to False Questions by Age and Interview Condition

Gave initial response
Condition/Age

Self-generated a response

Correct

Incorrect

Don't know

Correct

Incorrect

Don't know

3 (n = 14)

.01

.94

.01

.01

.02

n/a

4 (n = 17)
5 (n = 16)
Total
Something else
3 (n = 14)

.09
.16
.09

.68
.48
.69

.14
.28
.15

.09
.04
.05

.01
.06
.03

n/a
n/a

.04

.53

.10

.17

.15

.01

4 (n = 18)
5 (n = 15)

.10
.15

.42
.21

.11
.10

.13
.35

.11
.08

.13
.11

Total

.10

.39

.10

.21

.11

.09

Standard

Note. Rows may not add to one due to rounding. The bolded values are the two columns that when summed
show the children's total accuracy.
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something else condition, 41% of children's total 470 responses
were self-generated, for a total of 195 self-generated responses. Of
these 195 responses, 99 (5 1%) were correct. Compared with children in the standard condition, children in the something else
condition produced a higher number of incorrect self-generated
items, X 2 (l) = 9.59, p < .005, Cramer's V = -. 20. The odds of
a child generating an incorrect response in the something else
condition were 3.51 times the odds of a child producing an
incorrect response in the standard condition.

Unanswerable Questions
Overall accuracy. Collapsed across age, children in the standard condition were 23% accurate on the unanswerable question
items compared with 30% correct in the something else condition.
See Table 4. A 2 (condition: standard vs. something else) X 3 (age:
3- to 4- vs. 5-year-olds) ANOVA was conducted on the total
number of correct responses to the 10 unanswerable question
items. Paralleling the results on the true and the false question
items, the results revealed a main effect of age, F(2, 94) = 11.65,
p < .001, q2 = .21. The 5-year-olds outperformed both the 3- and
4-year-olds (p < .001 and p = .005, respectively) with the latter
two groups not differing from one another (p = .27). Neither the
main effect of condition, F(2, 94) = 1.52, p = .221, 9 = .02, nor
2
the Condition X Age interaction, F(2, 94) = 1.34, p = .267, rl
.03, attained significance.
Accuracy on self-generated responses. Next, we examined
children's performance on self-generated responses for unanswerable questions. In the standard condition, 3% of children's 470
overall responses were self-generated, for a total of 16 selfgenerated responses. None of the 16 responses were correct. In the
something else condition, 32% of children's 470 responses were
self-generated, for a total of 150 self-generated responses. Of
these, 29% (44/150) were correct (i.e., the child said, "don't
know," or otherwise verbalized they did not have the information
to answer the question). While both conditions were highly inaccurate when they self-generated responses to unanswerable questions, children in the something else condition generated their own
responses at a much higher rate compared to the standard condi-

Table 4
Children's Responses to Unanswerable Questions by Age and
Interview Condition
Gave initial response
Condition/Age
Standard
3 (n = 14)
4 (n = 17)
5 (n = 16)
Total
Something else
3 (n = 14)
4 (n = 18)
5 (n = 15)
Total

Correct
(Don't know)

Incorrect

.00
.17
.49
.23

.97
.76
.51
.74

.11
.17
.33
.20

.54
.52
.37
.48

Self-generated a response
Correct
(Don't know)

Incorrect
.03
.06
.01
.03

.07
.11
.10
.09

.28
.21
.20
.23

Note. Rows may not add to one due to rounding. The bolded values are
the two columns that when summed show the children's total accuracy.
Blank cells indicate "not applicable."

tion, X 2(1) = 6.39, p = .01. The odds of a child self-generating a
speculated response was over four times greater in the something
else condition compared with the standard condition.

Discussion
Many forensic interviewers across the United States have adopted the practice of using forced-choice questions with the inclusion of a third alternative, a something else option, when questioning child witnesses. We sought to empirically examine whether
the provision of a something else alternative indeed improved
children's performance on forced-choice questions without inviting them to guess or speculate.
The major finding of the study is that children showed very high
rates of incorrect responses on the false and the unanswerable
questions regardless of the something else alternative. When given
the something else alternative along with two other answer
choices, children selected the something else alternative 35% of
the time, at just over the chance rate. Stolzenberg et al. (2017)
found children selected the something else alternative at similar
rates. Our results extend upon past work by Stolzenberg et al. by
indicating a something else prompt does not bypass concerns about
children's performance on forced-choice questions even when
children are provided with an opportunity to follow up their
something else reply with their own self-generated response. Although children made use of the something else alternative, the
majority of their self-generated responses were inaccurate.
Our findings parallel past research indicating very high rates of
speculative responses on unanswerable questions (e.g., Hughes
Grieve, 1980; Waterman & Blades, 2011), a pattern that is not
ameliorated by the inclusion of the something else alternative.
Children made use of the something else alternative on the unanswerable questions, despite the fact that it did not significantly
improve their performance. In the standard forced-choice condition, children infrequently generated their own speculated response
to unanswerable items, but rather they tended to select one of the
alternatives provided to them. Children's overall accuracy on the
unanswerable items was similar in the something else and standard
conditions.
Children's performance on the unanswerable questions improved with age across both questioning conditions. However, no
developmental improvements occurred in children's accuracy according to the something else prompt. In the standard condition,
3-year-olds selected one of the two answer choices provided to
them for almost every unanswerable question. This finding highlights the dangers of using forced-choice questions with young
preschoolers for questions where the interviewer is uncertain
whether they are providing a correct alternative. The 3-year-olds
performed equally poorly in the something else and standard
conditions. Their rates of selecting an incorrect response on the
initial question was lowered by the something else prompt because
children selected the something else prompt about a third of the
time (chance rates with three options). However, when 3-year-olds
were prompted for their own responses on the unanswerable questions, they generally self-generated an inaccurate response. For
example, in our staged event, children used an unnamed doll to
show the location of where they had been touched. Children were
asked, "What was the doll's name, Sally, Sammy, or something
else?" One child replied, "Uncle Frank." Perhaps surprisingly,
&
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despite their immature vocabularies, even the 3-year-olds were
able to generate their own (inaccurate) responses when prompted.
Although children performed progressively better on the unanswerable items with age, even the 5-year-olds performance was at
about 50% accurate. Like the 3-year-olds, rather than indicating
they did not know the answer, older children tended to confabulate
a response on the unanswerable questions regardless of the inclusion of a something else alternative.
The something else alternative did produce higher accuracy
rates for the false questions (i.e., questions where no correct
response alternative was provided) compared to the standard twoalternative questions, but still performance was very poor on these
questions with overall 31% accuracy in the something else condition versus 15% correct in the standard condition. For the false
question items, again the 5-year-olds outperformed the 3- and
4-year-olds but no significant effect of the something else alternative emerged with age. With over half incorrect in the something
else condition, even with the oldest children, performance was
more apt to be inaccurate than accurate and was of low reliability
from a forensic perspective.
Like the unanswerable questions, children were much more apt
to self-generate their own response alternative when given the
additional something else alternative on false questions. However,
just over half of their self-generated responses were incorrect. In
terms of raw numbers of inaccurate self-generated responses,
children in the something else condition were over three times
more likely to generate incorrect responses compared with children in the standard condition. Hence, the something else prompt
might postpone children's speculated responses, but children still
performed poorly. This finding is consistent with extant literature
indicating children struggle on forced-choice questions when no
correct response alternative is provided (e.g., Fritzley et al., 2013;
Peterson & Grant, 2001; Rocha et al., 2013). Our data add to this
literature by demonstrating that children often will self-generate
their own inaccurate responses to questions when no correct alternative is provided.
One encouraging finding is that the something else prompt did
not have adverse effects on children's performance when true
answer choices were provided. However, when they did generate
their own responses on true items, over half were incorrect. For
example, one child was asked if they were touched on the ankle,
the elbow, or something else (with elbow being the correct choice)
and instead responded they were touched on the teeth. Children's
relatively low accuracy rates on the true questions suggest the
event details were not highly memorable to the 3- and 4-year-olds
following a 1-week delay. However, this does not negate the
findings for the false and unanswerable items demonstrating children provide and generate false and speculative responses to
adults' questions regardless of whether they remember the event.

Limitations and Future Directions
The current study has a number of limitations. First, our design
did not allow a direct comparison of children's accuracy on forcedchoice questions versus open-ended prompts. However, openended prompts were not included in the study for several reasons.
Foremost, we were primarily interested in whether the something
else prompt helped children resist providing inaccurate or speculative responses since these are the types of questions for which the
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something else prompt is used by forensic interviewers. There is
no logical match to the false and unanswerable questions in an
open-ended format. Further, a vast literature already documents
the superiority of open-ended prompts over forced-choice questions (e.g., Fivush, Peterson. & Schwarzmueller, 2002: Peterson.
Dowdin, & Tobin, 1999). The something else option is used by
interviewers with the idea that it eliminates children's tendency to
select an incorrect response, so we reasoned the logical starting
point was to compare standard forced-choice questions either with
or without the added something else alternative. Future studies
might directly compare the something else prompt with openended questions.
A second limitation of the study is that children performed
poorly on the true event questions, indicating they had a fuzzy
memory for the details of the event. However, given many children
delay abuse disclosure, we chose employed a delayed memory test.
Future work can test children's immediate memory using the
something else prompt. However, given Stolzenberg et al.'s (2017)
finding that children performed similarly poorly describing contemporaneously occurring touch or clothing placement on a doll,
we are skeptical that children's performance will be affected with
the something else prompt under shorter delays. Finally, replication is needed of these results. Experimental paradigms using
different staged events with forced-choice questions that are interspersed among more open-ended questions would more closely
parallel actual forensic interviews.
We hope our study helps generate further research on the
something else prompt, given the frequency by which it has been
adopted in forensic practice. More studies are needed to ensure our
results are robust across different questions involving different
events. Finally, our study design was driven by scientific considerations of experimental control and statistical power. In actual
forensic interviews, the interviewer generally intersperses the
something else prompts among other question types. Future studies
could employ a more ecologically valid presentation of the question types.

Forensic Implications
The major concern expressed by developmental psychologists
about forced-choice questions is that children tend to pick a
response regardless of whether they know the answer. Some practitioners have argued providing a something else alternative obviates concerns about children's tendency to pick an answer when
given forced-choice questions. Since forensic interviewers rarely
know whether they are including a correct response alternative, the
idea is the something else alternative makes children free to
generate their own response rather than locking them in to two
alternatives. For example, the following quote is taken from an
excerpt of expert testimony given by a forensic pediatrician:

Q: Also dangerous is asking yes or no questions, even when the
questions are not leading, right?
A: No, asking a yes or no question isn't necessarily leading. Especially if you give them more than yes or no. So yes, no, or something
else, that would be a multiple choice question . . . (State of Louisiana
vs. Keith Hall, 2011).
Similarly, a forensic interviewer testified to the use of the
something else option in a child sexual abuse trial stating,

LONDON, HALL, AND LYTLE
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... if they already made a disclosure of abuse, and we would ask, was
it on top of the clothes or underneath the clothes or something else?
We always want to give them that something else option, because
children are trying to answer adults, and if you give them two options,
a lot of times they're going to pick one. So we like to give them the
option of something else, in case it was a different way" (State of

2008; Poole, 2016) that emphasize the use of open-ended prompts
when interviewing children. Lamb and colleagues' corpora of
studies demonstrate that open-ended questions not only produce
more accurate reports but provide more complete reports as well,
even among preschoolers.

Texas vs. Jon Stover, 2013).
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